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Introduction
Exit poll prediction: 10pm on May 6th
UK Seats
CON LAB LD OTH
Prediction 307 255 59 29
Final result 307 258 57 28
How did we get this close?
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Introduction
Part I: General description of the methods
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Setup Analysis Team
2010 Exit poll and analysis team
Commissioned by BBC, ITN and Sky
Fieldwork by GfkNOP and Ipsos MORI.
Statistical analysis of exit poll data by John Curtice (Strathclyde),
Stephen Fisher (Oxford) and Jouni Kuha (LSE)
Also in the psephology team: Rob Ford, Will Jennings (Manchester),
Clive Payne (Oxford)
Statistical analysis and prediction of elections since 1970: Phil Brown,
Clive Payne, David Firth
The methods of analysis in 2010 were almost entirely, and computer
code very largely, the same as in 2005, and due to David Firth
see Curtice and Firth (2008), Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
A, 171, pp. 509-539
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Setup Principles
Basic Principles
Variance between constituencies greater than variance in change
between constituencies.
There may be bias in exit polling that is fairly stable over time.
So revisit same exit poll locations as last time for efficiency and hope
that any bias cancels.
Also, avoid uniform change assumptions by using a statistical model
to estimate the pattern of change.
Finally, allow for random fluctuations and so produce predicted
probabilities of each party winning, not (deterministic) assignments of
each seat to a single predicted winner.
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Setup Data
Data structure
130 polling stations (up from 120 in 2005)
104 were also used in 2005
a top-up of 26 new ones, with 2005 represented by constituency results
Choice of top-up locations motivated by:
rebalancing previous sample to restore strategic and regional profile
after attrition from boundary changes and other feasibility problems
with old locations
increasing coverage of Lab-LD contests (newly prevalent post 2005)
At each location, a systematic sample of voters throughout the day
18,688 interviews: an average of 144 per location, so large variance in
estimates of change at any particular location.
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Setup Data
Exit poll locations relative to 2005 results
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Main-party shares in the constituency in 2005 (red=new location in 2010)
Fisher and Kuha () Exit poll 2010 NCRM/BPC, 22.11.2010 7 / 19
Setup Method
Summary of the modelling procedure
1 Model for 2005-2010 changes in response variables Yparty , given
constituency-level explanatory variables
2 Predicted values Yˆ 2010party ,seat
3 Predicted shares ˆParty
2010
seat
4 Predicted probabilities of winning pˆi2010party ,seat
5 Predicted number of seats for a party is
ˆSeats
2010
party =
∑
seat
pˆi2010party ,seat
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Setup Method
Other methodological considerations
Postal Voting: No adjustment since limited change in its usage since
2005 and expensive and difficult to estimate the effects of change.
Refusals: Interviewers guessed the vote choice of all those
approached so that the relationship between the guesses and votes of
those who did respond could be used to impute votes for the 18%
who did not respond.
Non-contacts: There was a weighting method to adjust for lower
contact rates at busy times of day.
Neither imputation nor weighting made much difference so the
published predictions were based on raw unweighted data.
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Evaluation
Part II: Evaluation of the Exit Poll
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Evaluation
Main questions for the evaluation
How good was the data?
How good were the exit poll estimates of change both overall and in
comparison with the actual results in the sampled seats?
How good were the estimates for the new locations and should they
have been used?
How good was the modelling?
Did the models identify patterns of change that really existed, either
overall or in the sampled seats?
Were there any variables we missed?
Was it better to use probabilistic rather than deterministic prediction?
How did each of the sources contribute to the prediction?
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Evaluation The Data
Changes in the share of the vote
CON LAB LD
Exit poll +5.3 −7.5 +1.0
Overall Result +3.8 -6.5 +1.0
Seats in Sample +4.3 -7.1 +1.0
Spot on for the Lib Dems, but too large a Tory rise and Labour fall.
This is partly due to the nature of the selected locations.
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Evaluation The Data
Changes in the share of the vote: New and Old Locations
CON LAB LD
Old Locations:
Exit Poll +5.6 -8.5 +1.3
Seats in sample +4.2 -7.5 +1.3
New Locations:
Exit Poll +4.1 -3.0 -0.2
Seats in sample +4.8 -5.6 -0.2
Both old and new were spot on for the Lib Dems.
New seats had too small a Conservative rise and Labour fall, opposite
for old cases: differences not significant.
Nonetheless, compensating biases helped improve the overall figures.
Existence of a difference suggests we shouldn’t have used new
locations, but this was not observed on the day.
within the exit poll the difference between new and old was not
statistically significant for Con and LD.
Fisher and Kuha () Exit poll 2010 NCRM/BPC, 22.11.2010 13 / 19
Evaluation The Regression Models
Exit poll models: LD/(LD+LAB+CON)
Exit poll Actual (All Seats)
Predictor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
England 1.8 0.004 1.9 < 0.001
Scotland/Wales −5.0 0.030 −2.3 < 0.001
Exit poll model very close to reality.
Hard to improve on the model given we restricted ourselves to binary
predictor variables with no sharper than a 80:20 split.
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Evaluation The Regression Models
Exit poll models: LAB/(LAB+CON)
Exit poll Actual (All seats)
Predictor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
England −13.0 < 0.001 −10.4 < 0.001
Scotland/Wales −2.1 0.52 −5.1 < 0.001
<90% white
population 5.2 0.012 3.5 < 0.001
Labour incumbent
standing 3.9 0.024 2.3 < 0.001
Regression coefficients remarkably similar, and same again for selected 130
seats.
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Evaluation The Regression Models
What predictors did we miss?
Most notably,
Labour did worse where unemployment went up.
Labour did better where there were more public sector workers.
But these patterns were not apparent in the actual results for the
seats in the sample.
Strong preference for parsimonious models, so we may not have
wanted both these and previous variables all in the model.
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Evaluation Quality of Predictions
Calibration of the predicted probabilities
Predicted
probability (%) Wins/possible % Won
(0,10] 13/109 12
(10,20] 7/39 18
(20,30] 6/27 22
(30,40] 10/25 40
(40,50] 19/46 41
(50,60] 23/38 61
(60,70] 14/21 67
(70,80] 18/24 75
(80,90] 26/32 81
(90,100) 88/100 88
Given the predicted shares and the actual results, it appears that the
predicted probabilities could not have been improved on easily.
Fisher and Kuha () Exit poll 2010 NCRM/BPC, 22.11.2010 17 / 19
Evaluation Quality of Predictions
Results are sensitive to the modelling choices
Real and predicted UK seats:
CON LAB LD OTH
Real result 307 258 57 28
Uniform change from final polls 282 256 81 31
Deterministic & uniform change 321 234 65 30
Probabilistic & uniform change 319 236 65 30
Deterministic & regression models 303 254 63 30
Probabilistic & regression models
(as published at 10pm) 307 255 59 29
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Evaluation Quality of Predictions
Conclusion
Successful prediction was aided by all parts of the methodology: data,
modelling and probabilistic prediction.
Key shock of Lib Dem failure by comparison with the polls, was clear
from the very good data: Thanks to Ipsos MORI and GfkNOP!
But we were lucky to have compensating biases from new and old
locations for overall Labour and Conservative changes.
The models also helped redress the error.
The regression models did identify important sources of variation
between polling locations that was present in the actual constituency
results.
But other factors, such as unemployment and employment sector were
not identifiable because of the choice of locations.
As expected, probabilistic prediction made only a small improvement
in the prediction on this occasion.
While not perfect, the methodology seems to be broadly working well.
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